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 REFORMING THE REGULATION OF 
BROKER-DEALERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
INTRODUCTION 
The Challenges of Investing in Securities Markets for the Retail Investor 
When the U.S. economy faltered, individual American investors watched their hard 
earned savings disappear overnight. Investor confidence seemed irreparably shaken. Revelations 
of wrongdoing ensued: the market fraud committed by stockbroker and investment adviser 
Bernie Madoff, the architect of a $65 billion Ponzi scheme 1; the collapse of large, highly reputed 
financial finns like Bear-Sterns and Lehman Brothers2; and the $700 billion taxpayer-funded 
bailout of the U.S. Financial System.3 These scandals fueled concerns about inadequate 
regulation and an aggressive Congressional response to overhaul and re-evaluate current 
regulations that impact the sale of securities. 
Congress, in an effort to institute regulatory reforms to protect consumers and the U.S. 
financial system, enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
("Dodd-Frank''), which President Barack Obama signed into law on July 21,2010.4 The lengthy, 
894-page legislation also included provisions to re-evaluate the different regulatory schemes 
imposed on securities professionals, such as broker-dealers and investment advisers, who 
regularly interact with individual consumers. A top legislative concern remained protecting 
consumers from fraud and restoring investor confidence in securities markets. 
1 Diana B. Henriques, From Prison, MadoffSaid Banks 'Had to Knuw' of Fraud, TilE NEW YORK TIMES, FEB. 15,2011. 
2 Floyd No:rris, The Regulatory Failure Behind the .Bear Sterns Debacle, TilE NEW YORK TIMES. APR 4, 2008. 
3 EMERGENCY ECONOMlC STABILIZATION ACT§l2 U.S.C. 5201 (2009). 
4 1HE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT§ 12 U.S. C. 5301 (2011) 
[hereinafter "Dodd-Frank Act"]. The 894 page act contains many ambitious financial reform goals, including: 1) identifying and 
regulating systemic risk; 2) proposing an end to too-big-to-fail; 3) expanding the responsibility and authority of the Federal 
Reserve; 4) Restricting discretionary regulatory interventions; 5) reinstating a limited form of Glass-Stegall (the Volcker Rule); 
and 6) regulating and increasing transparency of derivatives. 
Page 1 of3Z 
Shareen Mani 
Still, even after the Dodd-Frank Act, investing in U.S. securities markets can prove a 
daunting and risky endeavor to the retail investor.5 As a result, many individuals that seek to 
invest and accumulate wealth through the stock market turn to securities professionals, such as 
stockbrokers or investment advisers, to guide their investment decisions. 6 However, this model 
presents a...ll iP..herent conflict. Bot.h parties seek to eam a profit;; and consumers often hold the 
weaker position. Without effective oversight, individual consumers remain vulnerable to 
predatory marketing practices. 
In order to protect consumers from unscrupulous securities professionals and increase the 
transparency of these transactions, the federal government and private self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs) remain active overseers of broker-dealers7 and investment advisers.8 
However, the regulations (and regulators, for that matter) goven.ring broker-dealers mJ.d 
investment advisers remai..ll separate and distinct.9 This paper seeks to examine the two differi_ng 
regulatory schemes and propose a methodology to reform the regulation of broker-dealers and 
investment advisers in order to better protect individual investors. 
5 Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act defmes a retail customer as a person or legal representative that receives personalized 
investment advice from a broker-dealer or investment adviser regarding securities, and subsequently uses this advice for personal, 
family or household purposes. For more information, see 15 U.S.C. § 78(c )(4)(A). 
6 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGUGLATION; CASES & 
MATERIALS (2009) at 1003. 
7Section 3(a)( 4) of the '34 Act defmes a broker as a person who engages in the business of effecting securities transactions for 
another's account; Section 3(a)(5) of the '34 Act defines a dealer as a person who buys or sells securities for his own account. 
Many securities professionals are dually registered, hence the terminology broker-dealer. For more information, see JAMES 
COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURJTIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 
(2009) at 1019. 
8 Investment Advisers are defined as persons who are in the business of giving investment advice but do not buy, sell, or execute 
trades for investors. For more information, see JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 
SECURJTIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS (2009) at 1075. 
9 Barbara Black, Fiduciary Duty, Professionalism and Investment Advice, University of Cincinnati College of Law Public Law & 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-24, March 28, 2010. 
Page 2 of32 
Shareen Mani 
Standards of Care and the Broker-Dealer Exclusion 
Currently broker-dealers and investment advisers are held to differing standards of care. 
While investment advisors are held to a legal standard of "fiduciary duty," broker-dealers are 
not, and remain accountable only for egregious misconduct, such as committing fraud on the 
market. 10 This regulatory gap, often called the broker-dealer exclusion, sparked debates among 
regulators, legislators and scholars concerned with consumer protection and unwanted securities 
litigation.11 Recent legislative provisions have recommended closing this gap through 
harmonizing regulations between these two groups of securities professionals. 
The Dodd-Frank Act also revisited this broker-dealer exclusion, specifically as it relates 
to retail investors, under §913.12 While the Dodd-Frank Act regrettably failed to eliminate the 
broker-dealer exclusion, it did require the Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC") to 
conduct an investigation that examined the consequences and impact that the divergent fiduciary 
vs. non-fiduciary status of investment advisers and broker-dealers had on retail investors. 13 At 
10 BLACK, supra at 2. 
See 15 U.S.C.§77q{a)(1988), which provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of 
transportation or communication in interstate commerce, or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) To obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or 
(3) To engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon the purchaser. 
11 BLACK, supra at 2. 
12 As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: This is a Study of the Staff of 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. January 2011. 
13 
'"The Dodd-Frank Acf' Title IX, § 913 
A retail customer is defined under § 913 as a natural perso~ or the legal representative of a natural person, who ( 1) receives 
personalized investment advice about securities from a broker or dealer or investment advisor; and (2) uses such advise primarily 
for personal, family or household purposes." 
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the conclusion, the Commission's report recommended the adoption of a uniform fiduciary 
standard between broker-dealers and investment advisors.14 
This paper contends that merely adopting the Commission recommendations to 
harmonize fiduciary standards of broker-dealers and investment advisors is too broad a mandate 
h • gful • • • L 15 to ave a meamn o . rmpact on secunt1es mar!<_ets. Many factors, like the current 
compensation structure of securities professionals, and the changing landscape of securities 
sales, make a broad mandate an inadequate response.16 In order to meaningfully harmonize the 
standards of fiduciary status between broker-dealers and investment advisers, while 
adequately providing consumer protection, this paper recommends that Congress adopt a 
rebuttable presumption that the law view retail investors with assets below a certain threshold 
as unsophisticated investors. Adopting such a presumption will enable both pa.t1:ies to better 
understand their obligations to one another, facilitate dispute resolution, and reduce unwanted 
securities litigation by shifting burdens of production and proof at trial. 
Part I of this paper briefly examines the legislative history governing the regulations of 
broker-dealers and investment advisers, the legal implicatio:t1s of fiduciary status and the 
suitability rule. Part II reviews the SEC Commission Report fmdings and recommendations. 
This section examines the practical challenges of adopting a uniform fiduciary standard in light 
of the current structure of broker-dealer compensation. 1bis section also discusses the legal 
concept of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. Finally, Part III examines the concept of 
14 The Commission report sought to evaluate the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards and the presence of 
potential regulatory gaps. Key considerations included evaluating whether or not consumers were confused by the differences in 
the standards of care; the current regulators and standards governing investment advisers and broker-dealers; the impact of any 
changes on retail customers and more. For more information, please see the Commission report (As Required by Section 913 of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: This is a Study of the Staff of the US. Securities and 
Exchange Commission. January 2011, p.6.) 
15 DONALD L. LANGEVOORT, Brokers as Fiduciaries, University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Spring 2010 (71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
439), 4. 
16 LANGEVOORT, Supra at 5. 
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rebuttable and conclusive presumptions. It discusses the legal implications of adopting a 
rebuttable presumption that the law view retail investors with assets below a certain threshold as 
tmsophisticated. It is important to note that concerns abound on this topic with respect to 
institutional investors. While Part III will contain a brief discussion to put this issue in context, 
substantive discussions on institutional investor sophistication remain outside the scope of this 
paper.17 
I. The Legislative History Governing The Regulations of Broker-Dealers & 
Investment Advisers 
In order to understand the importance of harmonizing standards between broker-dealers and 
investment advisers, it remains critical to understand the historical context of existing 
regulations, and the legal standards currently imposed upon broker-dealers and investment 
advisers. 
The SEC & Broker-Dealers 
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (''The '34 Act") to create 
mechanisms to hold publicly-traded companies accountable for disclosure and to protect 
investors from fraud perpetrated by unscrupulous companies and their representatives.18 One of 
the most important provisions of the '34 Act is the requirement for continuous mandatory 
disclosure by certain publicly traded companies.19 The '34 Act also governs the regulation of 
17 For additional information on institutional investor sophistication, please consult the following law review journal article: 
Normal S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to Institutional Investors (Brigham Young 
University Law Review), 200 I. 
18 JAMES COX, ROBERT W.lllLLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERIALS (2009) at 5. 
19 The '34 Act requires continuous disclosure requirements for three (3) categories of companies: those that have securities listed 
on national exchanges; those companies with assets that exceed $10 million and are held by at least 500 persons; and companies 
that have filed a registration statement required under the '33 Act. Examples of continuous disclosure documents include proxy 
filings, annual reports, and other federally required information. For more information, consult the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 
Sections 12(b), 12 (g) and 15(d) or see JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS (2009) at 7. 
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broker-dealers. The law defines a broker under 15 U.S.C. §78(c)(4)(A) as "any person engaged 
in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others. "20 The law 
defines a "dealer" under 15 U.S.C. §78(c)(5)(A) "as any person engaged in the business of 
buying and selling securities for such person's own account through a broker or otherwise."21 
Many sectL."'ities professionals are dually registered. 
Despite the intent of the federal government to require transparency from publicly traded 
companies, statistics show that the principal audience for this federally required data consists of 
investment analysts and professional analysts, who use and interpret the data for themselves. 
Tnese professionals formulate advice or recommendations, and use the broker as the conduit to 
convey information to the average individual investor?2 This information transfer process, 
known as ''filtering", has positive effects and negative ones. 23 While it helps reduce information 
overload for the individual investor, it also poses potential conflicts of interest, particularly if a 
broker-dealer or his firm holds positions in securities that could benefit from sales or 
purchases. 24 
In its oversight capacity, the SEC's "Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration" provides an 
outline of generally required rules of conduct for these securities professionals. Broker-dealers 
must comply with antifraud provisions, which impose a prohibition of issuing false or misleading 
statements, material omissions or engaging in fraudulent or manipulative acts as they relate to 
the purchase and sale of securities.25 Several provisions of the '34 Act also require the SEC to 
oversee broker-dealer obligations, in particular the following: a duty of fair dealing; a duty to 
20 15 U.S.C. §78(c)(4)(A) 
21 15 U.S.C. §78(c)(5)(A) 
22 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERIALS 2009) at 1003. 
23 !d. at 1003. 
24 !d. at 1 003. 
25 
"Conduct Regulation of Broker-Dealers." At S.E.C. Website, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreglbdguide.htrri#V 
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recommend suitable securities for their customers (the suitability requirement); a duty of best 
execution; a customer confirmation rule; a disclosure of credit terms; restrictions on short sales; 
trading during an offering; and restrictions on insider trading?6 
The Suitability Rule & SROs 
The intention of these anti-fraud provisions is to prevent broker-dealers from issuing false 
or misleading statements, omitting material facts, or committing any other fraudulent or 
manipulative acts related to the purchase and sale of securities?7 Concerns abound regarding the 
increasingly fragmented nature of securities markets, particularly since ethical concerns 
governing broker-dealers typically turn on obligations of fmns to "make informed and suitable 
recommendations, to avoid churning28, unauthorized trades, and excessive markups. "29 The 
requirement that broker-dealers recommend securities that are suitable for the investment 
goals and needs of their customers forms the basis of the suitability rule. 30 
The SEC and independent self-regulatory organizations (''SROs") regulate and oversee 
the conduct of broker-dealers.31 The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority C".FINRA'') sets 
rules and examinations for broker-dealers, and also serves as the enforcer for the SEC's rules of 
26 Conduct Regulation ofBroker-Dealers." At S.E.C. Website, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketregfbdguide.htm#V, See '34 
Act Sections 9(a), 10(b), and 15 (c)(1) and 15(c)(2) 
27 Conduct Regulation ofBroker-Dealers." S.E.C. Website, httv://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketregfbdguide.htm#V, See '34 Act 
Sections 9(a), IO(b), and 15 (c)(1) and 15(c)(2) 
28 Churning refers to a broker's excessive buying and selling of securities in a customer's account for the purpose of generating 
commissions. For churning to occur, an investor's broker must exercise control over the investment decisions in a customer's 
account. Churning may violate SEC Rule 15c1-7 and other securities regulations. For more information, visit: 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/churning.htm 
29 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERlALS 2009) at 1004. 
3° For more information on FINRA's Suitability Rule (NASD Rule 2310) and the New York Stock Exchange Suitability Rule 
(Rule 405) visit: http://www.sec.gov/answers/suitability.htm 
31 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MA TERlALS 2009) at 1020. 
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conduct.32 While the SEC retains independent authority, FINRA plays a prominent, supervisory 
role of broker-dealers. 33 As we shall see in the next section, the distinction between regulators 
and rules of conduct between broker-dealers and investment advisers gave rise to the 
recommendation by the Commission Report for a harmonized standard between the two 
Investment Advisers 
While retail investors may tum to broker-dealers for investment advice, a great number of 
investors also turn to professional investment counselors and financial planners.34 Unlike 
broker-dealers, investment advisers do not execute trades in a customer's account, but provide 
investment recommendations and often deduct a management fee for advisory services.35 As 
with broker-dealers, this practice, which revolves around profit-motivated securities sales and 
purchases, lends itself to conflicts of interest and the perpetration of fraud against investors. 36 
Regulators of Investment Advisors 
Investment advisers may dispense advice through personalized consultations or advisory 
letters sent en masse to a group of subscribers. 37 Both types of communication remain regulated 
by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which provides broad regulatory framework for 
32 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERlALS 2009) at 1022. 
33 ld at I 022. 
34 I d. at I 075. 
35 Id. at 1075. 
36 ld. at 1075. 
37 ld at 1 075. 
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protecting consumers from the abuses of unscrupulous or incompetent advisers. 38 An investment 
adviser is defmed under Section 202 (11) of the Investment Adviser's Act as any person 
''who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or 
through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing in, purchasing or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a 
regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities."39 
The law also prohibits investment advisers from engaging in activities that can perpetuate 
fraud or dishonest behavior toward clients. 40 While the statutory definition includes an array of 
exclusions,41 its most notable exclusion refers specifically to broker-dealers "whose advisory 
activities are solely incidental to the conduct of that business.',42 This is known as the broker-
dealer exclusion. 
After registration, an investment adviser remains subject to regulatory requirements and 
disciplinary provisions - similar to those of broker-dealers - that may include suspension or 
revocation of adviser abilities, fines or any other disciplinary behavior as applicable for willfully 
violating provisions of federal securities laws. 43 Absent an exemption, investment advisers must 
keep records, file reports, adopt written advisory policies, and remain subject to inspection upon 
threat of civil penalties.44 The SEC recently adopted an amended rule 206(4) under the 
38 I d. at 1076. 
39 !d. at 1076. 
40 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206(3). Prohibited Activities include: "(3) acting as principal for his own account, 
knowingly to sell any security to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as a broker or dealer for a person other than 
such client, knowingly effect any sale or purchase of any security for the account of such client, without disclosing to such client 
in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to 
such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph (3) shall not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if 
such broker or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction." 
41 Among the exclusions are: (1) most banking activity; (2) lawyers or other professionals providing incidental investment-related 
services; (3) broker-dealers whose advise is incidental to regular business; (4) media publications and other publications of 
general circulation; (5) persons whose advise relates to government securities. For more information, see JAMES COX, 
ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURJTIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 2009) 
at 1076. 
42 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURJTIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERIALS 2009) at 1 076. 
43 I d. at 1078. 
44 !d. at 1078. 
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Fiduciary Obligations, The Shingle Theory & The Suitability Rule 
In light of the distinctions between broker-dealers and investment advisers, it is important 
to understand why the concept of fiduciary status in the context of broker-dealers and investment 
advisers remains under debate. Two different standards and regulators now exist. Broker-
dealers are regulated under the '34 Act and regulated principally by FINRA, while investment 
advisers are regulated under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and overseen largely by the 
SEC.51 Broker-dealers work for "customers" while investment advisers manage "clients."52 
Most notably, the broker-dealer relationship does not give rise to fiduciary obligations unless the 
broker-dealer can effect trades without the customer's knowledge, whereas the investment 
adviser is viewed as a fiduciary in the eyes of the law.53 Fiduciary claims are some of the most 
common claims brought in arbitration, including claims of undisclosed revenue sharing 
payments. 54 
The importance of fiduciary duty is perhaps best demonstrated by the recent demise of 
Bernie Madoff' s sham investment company and its effect on retail investors, who lost large sums 
of money. Bernie Madoff was one of many investment advisors and broker-dealers. The SEC 
reported that over 11,000 investment advisors are registered with the Commission and manage 
more than $38 trillion for more than 14 million clients. 55 Similarly, the Commission and FINRA 
oversee approximately 51,000 broker-dealers, who hold over 109 million retail and institutional 
accounts. 56 
51BLAC.K supra at 4. 
52 BLAC-K supra at 5. 
53 BLAC-K supra at 5. 
54 Mercer Bullard, Papers on a Fiduciary Duty for Broker-Dealers: The Fiduciary Study: A Triumph of Substance Over Form?" 
The Trustees ofBoston University, Review ofBanking & Financial Law, Fal12010. (30 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 171). 
55 I d. At 4. 
56 ld. At 4. 
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The presence (and conversely, the absence) of a fiduciary responsibility has far reaching 
implications. Scholars find as a unifying characteristic that a fiduciary relationship is defmed as 
"a substitute for the entrustor" where the "fiduciary obtains power for the purpose of enabling 
the fiduciary to act effectively."57 In other words, once a fiduciary relationship is established, the 
.,:;;an ... ;~~' ..,.,:uaco +ha F>l~ant ''at th""' V""'f)' le. ast.. d, .... ·sclosure of all i.trl'ormation material to the 
.l.lUU'-'.lu.J.) V YY ...... .:JI '-.. l.l....... ..................... "" "" ~ - - -
transaction at hand, including conflicts of interest."58 Most courts have historically been 
reluctant to impute fiduciary status to broker-dealers (with one exception: a sophisticated 
itJ.vestor ). 59 Also required under the fiduciary standard are duties of loyalty and care. This 
means that advisers with conflicts of interest must either eliminate the conflict or inform the 
client about these potential conflicts. 60 
However, advocates of the Shingle Tneory argue that once a customer seeks out a broker-
dealer to effect trades and to provide advice and counsel, that broker-dealer has represented 
himself as an entrustor, or fiduciary, to their customers by the mere act of hanging out his 
shingle. 61 Many disgruntled investors invoke the shingle theory under federal securities laws to 
hold broker-dealers accountable through their implicit representation that they will deal fairly 
and honorably with their customers. 62 
Scholars argue that the shingle theory imputes an obligation for fair dealing and implies 
that a breach of such duty can easily be inferred as fraudulent. 63 Sanctions against brokers are 
governed by Rule lO(b)-5, which are part of the general rules and regulations promulgated under 
57 BLACK, supra at 11. 
58 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERIALS 2009) at 1028. 
59 ld. at 1028. 
60 
"Executive Summary," As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: This 
is a Study of the Staff of the US. Securities and Exchange Commission. January 2011, p.3 
61 Roberta S. Karma!. ''Is the Shingle Theory Dead?" 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev., 1271, 1995. 
62 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERIALS 2009) at 1029. 
63 !d. at 1029. 
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the '34 Act that deem it unlawful to engage in fraud in the connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security. 64 In contrast, investment advisors are governed under a completely different 
standard than broker-dealers and automatically deemed fiduciaries. 65 
This merges with the suitability requirements imputed on broker-dealers and investment 
advisers. This guideline, set forth by the SEC and known as the suitability rule, requires that 
securities professionals offering services and investment advice recommend investments suitable 
to their customer's investment objectives. An example of a suitability violation would consist of 
a broker recommending a risky, speculative security for a conservative investor, such as an 
elderly widow seeking to invest her retirement savings without a means to replace any 
substantial trading losses or a complete understanding of the potential for sizeable losses. 66 
Suitability remains an important consideration, particularly when an investor lacks sophistication 
of the market and relies on the trust of a broker-dealer. 
It is important to note that while this paper favors harmonizing broker-dealer and 
investment adviser fiduciary obligations, opponents point to a number of factors against unifying 
the standards, most notably, the increased cost to businesses due to heightened government 
regulation. Other opponents point to the rise in arbitration proceedings and lawsuits against 
broker-dealers, and question vvheL1.er or not further regulatory requirements will adversely ar-'fect 
the ability of securities professionals to operate efficiently in our current market structure. Part II 
will review these concerns in light of this paper's proposed recommendations for practically 
implementing a uniform fiduciary standard, but fmds these concerns unwarranted given the 
64 I d. at I 029. 
65 ld. at 1079. 
66 NormanS. Poser, '"Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to Institutional Investors." Brigham Young 
University Law Review 1493,2001. 
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government's overriding objective and public policy determination to encourage participation in 
U.S. securities markets.67 
IT: The Commission Report Findings, Implementation of a Uniform Fiduciary Standard 
and Sophisticated v. Unsophisticated Investors 
The Commission Report Findings 
Section §913 of the Dodd-Frank Act called for the SEC to evaluate the different 
regulatory regimes governing broker-dealers and investment advisers. Regulators and Congress 
grew concerned that these differing standards created a tremendous amount of investor 
confusion.68 The SEC published its report in January 2011. The Commission's multi-
disciplinary research approach relied on input and comments from interested parties, including 
retail h1vestors; representatives of the financial services industry; state securities regulators; 
SROs such as FINRA and the North American Securities Administrator Association 
(''NASAA"). 69 The Commission report remained chiefly concerned with the personalized advice 
retail customers received from broker-dealers and investment advisers as they related to 
securities. 70 These concerns arose due to overwhelming concerns about fraud and a lack of 
accountability for broker-dealers. 71 
The Commission report evaluated the following: the effectiveness of existing legal and 
regulatory standards for personalized investment advice about securities to retail customers; and 
57 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HILL~AA..""J AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SEClJRITIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERIALS 2009) at 5. 
68 
"Executive Summary," As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: This 
is a Study of the Staff of the US. Securities and Exchange Commission. January 2011, p.2. 
69 As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: This is a Study of the Staff of 
the US. Securities and Exchange Commission. January 2011, p.3. 
70 Id at 3. 
71 !d. at 3. 
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the impact of legal or regulatory shortcomings on the protection of retail customers. 72 
Ultimately, the Commission report recommended the institution of a uniform fiduciary standard 
between broker-dealers and investment advisors. 73 The Staff recommended in particular the 
promulgation of rules to promote best codes of conduct, and require securities professionals to 
act in the best interests of their customers without regard to the interests of the broker-dealer or 
investment adviser. 74 In addition to rules that promulgate a uniform standard of conduct, the 
Commission encouraged the implementation of a uniform fiduciary standard that encompassed a 
Duty of Loyalty.75 The goal of this standard was for securities professionals to eliminate or 
disclose material conflicts of interest to customers or clients. 76 
Implementation of a Uniform Fiduciary Standard 
The Commission findings also strongly supported the implementation of a uniform 
fiduciary standard, and pointed to the benefits conferred on retail investors. Specifically, the 
findings indicated that a uniform standard would: increase investor protection and investor 
awareness; accommodate different models and preserve investor choice, which remains 
particularly important in an era of consumer choice and autonomy; 77 and hold investment 
72In this special study, the Commission proposed requiring disclosure of precise amounts of revenue sharing payments. The 
Commission also considered whether or not the fiduciary distinction causes confusion to retail customers. The study evaluated 
the impact of eliminating the broker-dealer exclusion and studied the additional potential costs to consumers from potential 
regulatory changes. For more information, see the Commission Report, ••As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: This is a Study of the Staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission". 
January 2011, p. 2-3. 
73 As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: This is a Study of the Staff of 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. January 2011, p.6. 
74 Id. at 6. 
75 Id at 7-8. 
76 ld. at 7-8. 
77 Andrea Ryan, Gunnar Trumbull and Peter Tufano. ••A Brief Postwar History of Consumer Finance." Harvard Business School 
(201 0), p. 4. 
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Investment Adviser's Act, which enables the SEC to promulgate a fiduciary standard for 
broker-dealers that provide personalized investment services."45 
The principal purpose behind these disclosure requirements for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers is to facilitate the legal principle of caveat emptor, or, let the buyer beware.46 
The L1vestment Advisers Act of 1940 was t.'lJ.e last L"l a series of L"lvestor~protection provisions 
enacted by Congress, designed to curtail abuses in the securities industry that contributed to the 
1929 stock market crash and subsequent Great Depression. 47 
The legislative goals and guiding principles of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 were 
to preserve the ability of investment advisers to offer customized advice to clients; to eliminate 
conflicts of interest between adviser and client; and to protect ''unsophisticated investors',48 by 
providing ''bona fide investment counse1.',49 In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital 
Gains Research 375 U.S. 180 (1963), the court reaffirmed these goals and deemed investment 
advisers as "fiduciaries" owing to the "delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory 
relationship."50 The assignation of an inherent fiduciary status for investment advisers, but not 
broker-dealers, remained a source of contentious debate. The Dodd-Fran.'~( legislation and its 
provisions examining these differing standards re-affirms that the matter remains unresolved 
amongst scholars, legislators and securities professionals. 
45 Morrison & Forester. '"The Dodd-Frank Act: A Cheat Sheet" (2010), available at 
http:l/www.mofo.com/files!Up/oadsllmages!SummaryDoddFrank.Act.pd( 
46 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. lllLLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURJTIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERIALS 2009) at 1080. 
47 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). See also JAMES COX, ROBERT W. 
Hll..LMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURJTIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 2009) at 1079. 
48 An investor is deemed sophisticated if they possess sufficient understanding and intelligent to evaluate a broker's 
recommendations and exercise judgment independently. An unsophisticated investor lacks these skills. For further discussion on 
this topic, see Norman Poser's Law Review Article "Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to Institutional 
Investors, published in 2001 in the Brigham Young University Law Review. (2001 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1493) 
49 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. lllLLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURJTIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERIALS 2009) at 1081. 
50 ld at 1081. 
Page 10of32 
Shareen Mani 
advisers and broker-dealers to the same professional standards; and facilitate investors receiving 
advice that is in their best interests. 78 
Opponents of imputing a harmonized fiduciary status on brokers-dealers and investment 
advisers fear the costs associated with additional regulation. 79 They maintain that the imposition 
of t.lJ.e entire investment adviser regime would present onerous requirements for brokers. One 
most visible requirement is that investment advisers register in the state s where they conduct 
business. 80 Opponents of unifying the regulatory regimes point to the fact that additional 
registration requirements for brokers could potentially increase the cost of business for securities 
firms and reduce investor choice. 81 These concerns remain unwarranted and reflect merely the 
preference of private business to remain autonomous from substantial governmental regulation. 
82 
Furthermore, while preserving investor choice and keeping costs low remains a principal 
concern for private securities firms and the federal government, it is also important to recognize 
that federal policy favors retail investor participation in securities markets. 83 The absence of 
individual investor involvement, sometimes referred to as a crisis in investor confidence, remains 
one of the chief concerns during the current U.S. economic challenges.84 Ultimately, the federal 
78 As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: This is a Study of the Staff of 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. January 2011, p.9. 
79 Currently broker-dealers register only with the SEC. Opponents of the harmonized standard fear that imposing the equivalent 
requirements for broker-dealers and investment advisers would lead to duplicative registrations for broker-dealers, reduce 
investor choice and increase costs. For more information, see: As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act: This is a Study of the Staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Janua1y' 2011, p.140. 
8° Currently broker-dealers register only with the SEC. Opponents of the harmonized standard fear that imposing the equivalent 
requirements for broker-dealers and investment advisers would lead to duplicative registrations for broker-dealers, reduce 
investor choice and increase costs. For more information, see: As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act: This is a Study of the Staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. January 2011, p.140. 
81 As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: This is a Study of the Staff of 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. January 2011, p.140-141. 
82 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HTI...LMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURJTIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERIALS 2009) at 1029. 
83 ld at 1029. 
84 Jd at 1029. 
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government remains motivated to maximize investor participation in securities markets and to 
balance consumer protection with regulatory oversight. 85 Unless investors feel confident that 
adequate safeguards exist to protect them from predatory brokerage practices, fraud and other 
forms of misconduct, retail participation in the securities markets could precipitously decline. 86 
Even with current regulatory regimes, challenges remain. For instance, the SEC received 
over 3,000 complaints against online brokers in 1999, an increase of almost 200% from 1998, 
and a 1200% increase from 1997.87 Concerns abound that some online brokers invoke a 
predatory behavior to "entice unsophisticated investors to trade online and encourage investment 
purchases that are not appropriate."88 Promulgating laws and codes of conduct that inspire trust 
and confidence from investors is the only way to encourage investor participation in securities 
markets. These external factors, coupled with the near collapse of the U.S. economy, formed the 
basis for provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Sophisticated v. Unsophisticated Investors 
Opponents of a harmonized fiduciary standard also point to the equally concerning rise in 
arbitration by disenchanted retail investors who subsequently bring suitability violations. 89 In 
her scholarly article, Renee Brunett describes the tale of Lael Desmond, a 27-year-old graduate 
student that convinced an arbitration panel to compensate him for $40,000 in fees and 
compensatory damages when he traded stock with an online broker.90 Mr. Desmond's principle 
85 ld at 1029. 
86 Renee Barnett. "Comment: Online Trading and National Association of Securities Dealers' Suitability Rule: Are Online 
Investors Equally Protected?" The American University Law Review, June 2000 (49 Am.U.L.Rev.l089) 
87 ld at 4. 
88 Id at 4. 
89 I d. at 4. 
90 ld. at 5. 
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argument rested on his lack of knowledge about the risks of trading on margin.91 Lawsuits such 
as Mr. Desmond's bring to light the concern about investor sophistication and a retail investor's 
ability to adequately understand the risks in the securities market. Prof. Barnett postulates that 
lawsuits like Desmond's are likely to continue in troubled economic times, when hungry brokers 
returns in a down market.92 The concept of balancing retail investor sophistication with 
fiduciary standards will be further discussed in Part III of this paper. 
Ultimately, the Commission sought to evaluate these concerns in its recommendations. 
Its conclusions rest chiefly on the implementation of a uniform fiduciary standard without 
completely overhauling the broker-dealer exclusion.93 Rather, the Commission called for 
additionai ruie-making by the SEC as part of its overriding goal to protect investors, while taking 
into consideration the current U.S. model for broker-dealer compensation.94 
Two types of broker-dealer relationships can arise between the securities professional and 
their customer. In some instances, a broker merely executes the wishes of a client, i.e. buy 100 
shares of a particular stock. In this instance, the client dictates the terms, and the broker merely 
effectuates the trade. However, lawsuits like Mr. Desmond's raise concerns about investor 
suitability and sophistication, as well as questions of whether or not brokers must exercise a duty 
of care. 
In the second instance, brokers aggressively push and market securities to their customer 
list. It is important to remember that the typical method of compensation in the stock brokerage 
91 !d. at 5. 
92 !d. at 6. 
93 As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: This is a Study of the Staff of 
the US. Securities and Exchange Commission. January 2011, p.144. 
94 !d. at 158. 
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industry comes in the form of commissions that result from spreads or simply transaction 
volume, or a per transaction basis.95 This can create a conflict of interest for brokers to 
encourage an investor to buy and sell actively, without regard to the quality of those transactions, 
and similarly also lead to policy questions as to the benefits of excessive trading over securities 
exchanges.96 In some instances, the broker also maintains control over the client's account, and 
can effectuate trades and transactions without the client's approval or consent. These instances 
have led to the most frequent allegations and demands for a fiduciary level of care to be imposed 
on broker-dealers. 97 
The SEC's promulgation of rules and codes of conduct is intended to curtail and address 
these conflicts of interest. However the evolving nature and heightened competition of the 
securities business has raised concerns about overly enthusiastic brokers who misrepresented the 
nature and risk of the securities they are selling.98 Similarly, scholars of securities regulations, 
such as Prof. Donald Langevoort, point to the fact that some investors pay significantly more for 
investments sold through a broker channel, without any guarantees of better performance. 99 A 
chief concern raised is that sellers of these securities (broker-dealers) possessed a greater 
knowledge of the risk associated with the products or services that they aggressively marketed to 
retail customers.100 This knowledge gap poses substantial risks to less wealthy, less 
sophisticated participants in the securities markets. 
95 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. Hll.LMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERIALS 2009) at 1003. 
96 ld. at 1004. 
97 BLACK, supra at 11. 
98 POSER, supra at 4. 
99 LANGEVOORT,_supra at 11. 
100 LANGEVOORT,_supra at 6. 
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An investor's sophistication plays a key role in determining whether or not an investment 
1s suitable or not. 101 An investor is deemed sophisticated if (s)/he possess sufficient 
understanding and intelligence to evaluate a broker's recommendations and exercise judgment 
independently. 102 An unsophisticated investor lacks these skills. 103 Claims brought under Rule 
investor, and raises the question of whether the investor "justifiably relied on the misstatements 
or omissions."104 The natural filtering process that occurs in the marketplace presents ripe 
opportunities for savvy broker-dealers to prey on an unsophisticated investor's lack of 
understanding and knowledge in the marketplace. 
Opponents of this seemingly paternalistic mindset might argue that broker-dealers 
perform a critical sales ftmction in the securities markets, and that retail investors must know 
their security and that caveat emptor should prevail to protect L"lvestment firms from u.-rmecessary 
lawsuits that rest on suitability claims. 105 In other words, it is the responsibility of the buyer to 
fully educate himself on the risks of certain securities and independently exercise judgment as to 
whether or not to participate in the purchase or sale of a particular security. 
While this raises a valid viewpoint, it is important to remember that the current state of 
the securities market has given rise to the evolution and creation of complex derivatives, some of 
which are custom-made by broker-dealers for the sole purpose of selling to select groups of 
101 POSER, supra at 5. 
102 LANGEVOORT, supra at 7. 
103 LANGEVOORT, supra at 7. 
104 POSER, supra at 5. 
105Broker-dealers are required to adhere to the "know-your-customer" rule, whereby they understand the investment needs and 
risks relevant to their particular customers. On the flip side, securities professionals advocate that investors need to take an active 
interest in their own investments and adhere to a "know-your-security" rule, where they understand the potential risks and 
benefits of investments in a particular security. For more information, see: LANGEVOORT, supra 8. 
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customers.106 In this rapidly evolving financial world, driven by increased competition, new 
technology and new investment instrwnents, frequently the only individuals that may fully 
understand the complexities of these new fmancial instruments are the firms and individuals that 
create them. 107 This creates challenges to the traditional notions of investor sophistication. 
Experts who have studied institutional investor sophistication fmd that decisions to 
purchase stock remain largely motivated by the advice of others, turning even a sophisticated 
investment officer into ''easy prey for a skillful and highly motivated securities salesman." 108 
While the sophistication of institutional investors remains outside the scope of this paper, this 
data is relevant because it demonstrates the susceptibility of sophisticated, skilled financial 
professionals, to succumb to unsuitable securities recommendations. It is only a logical 
extension that the average retail investor lacks even more knowledge about securities and could 
prove an easy target for a manipulative broker-dealer, hungry for an easy commission. 
PART lll: RECOMMENDATION THAT CONGRESS ADOPT A REBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION 
In light of the concerns regarding fiduciary duty, suitability and investor sophistication, it 
is logical that Congress adopt a method to protect investors and create a framework for further 
SEC regulation under the recommendations of the Dodd-Frank Commission Report. To further 
encourage participation in securities markets while deterring fraud, it is imperative that Congress 
adopt a rebuttable presumption under the law to view retail investors below a certain investment 
threshold as unsophisticated investors. The significance of this status is that it would create 
106 POSER, supra at 5. 
107 ld. at 5. 
108 ld at 6. 
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simple and effective way to deter unsuitability claims and aggressive broker-dealer or investment 
adviser pitches to inappropriate client bases. 109 
Furthermore, the adoption of such a standard would protect both parties. Presumptions 
shift burdens of production and burdens of proof during litigation. In the case of broker-dealers 
at''1d investment advisers, the p(h"ties would have more ir.Jonnation about their obligations to each 
other. In the event of a dispute, it would be easier for the parties to evaluate the merits of their 
claims and their likelihood to prevail in court. 
The Significance of a Rebuttable Presumption 
Currently the law accords a legal status to two types of presumptions - rebuttable and 
conclusive. A rebuttable presw-nption that a retail investor below a certain investment threshold 
is unsophisticated means that the law assumes the investor is unsophisticated unless the broker-
dealer could rebut the presumption by introducing evidence of sophistication.110 This differs 
from a conclusive presumption, a rule of substantive law, which makes the details of any 
individual's circumstances largely irrelevant.111 Creating a rule that retail investors below 
certain investment thresholds are unsophisticated would simply result in the creation of a legal 
rul~ that .reruoves the question of suitability and sophistication for many types of i11vestors that 
could potentially bring claims against broker-dealers or investment advisers to court. 112 
Furthermore, such a standard would deter unscrupulous securities professionals from marketing 
securities to unsuitable retail investors. 
109 ld. at 8. 
110 ld. at 8. 
111 Jd. at 9. 
112-
ld. at 9. 
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Presumptions of Sophistication 
In the institutional context, courts have not adopted any presumptions for or against 
sophistication and considered the cases on an individual basis. 113 However some experts, such 
as Professor Langevoort, have argued in favor of structuring securities sales to institutions in a 
fashion that is similar to sales of private placement offerings to qualified investors.114 The term 
"private placement'' refers to the placement of a debt or security that is exempt from registration 
with the SEC because the transaction is not offered to the general public.115 These types of 
transactions traditionally remain restricted to accredited investors.116 
Accredited Investors 
113 ld. at 10. 
114 LANGEVOORT, supra at 9. 
115 Mark Carey, Stephen Prowse, John Rea, and Gregory Udell. "'The Economics of the Private Placement Market," The Federal 
Reserve Board, December 1993. 
116 The '33 Act defined an accredited investor as any person who comes within any of the following categories, or who the issuer 
reasonably believes comes within any of the following categories, at the time of the sale of the securities to that person: (1)Any 
bank as defined in section 3(a)(2) of the Act, or any savings and loan association or other institution as defined in section 
3(a)(5)(A) of the Act whether acting in its individual or fiduciary capacity; any broker or dealer registered pursuant to section 15 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; any insurance company as defined in section 2(a)(l3) of the Act; any investment 
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or a business development company as defined in section 
2(a)(48) of that Act; any Small Business Investment Company licensed by the U.S. Small Business Administration under section 
301 (c) or (d) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958; any plan established and maintained by a state, its political 
subdivisions, or any agency or instrumentality of a state or its political subdivisions, for the benefit of its employees, if such plan 
has total assets in excess of $5,000,000; any employee benefit plan within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 if the investment decision is made by a plan fiduciary, as defined in section 3(21) of such act, which is 
either a bank, savings and loan association, insurance company, or registered investment adviser, or if the employee benefit plan 
has total assets in excess of $5,000,000 or, if a self~directed plan, with investment decisions made solely by persons that are 
accredited investors; Any private business development company as defined in section 202(a)(22) of the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940;Any organization described in section 50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. corporation, Massachusetts or similar 
business trust, or partnership, not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, with total assets in excess of 
$5,000,000;.Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or any director, 
executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer; Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint 
net worth with that person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000; Any natural person who had an individual 
income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's spouse in excess of 
$300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year; Any 
trust, with total assets in excess of $5,000,000, not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, whose 
purchase is directed by a sophisticated person as described in Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) and any entity in which all of the equity owners 
are accredited investors. For more information, please visit: http://www.sec.gov/answers/accred.htm 
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An accredited investor is an investor that has a high net worth, the value of which is 
defined by federal securities law.117 The status of purchasers as accredited investors is important 
under several SEC Rules of law - Rule 505 and 506 - which restrict the availability of certain 
offerings to a limited pool of investors.118 Accredited investors are conclusively presumed to be 
sophlsticated.119 It is only \vhen a purchaser does not meet the standards of accreditation that an 
issuer must ''undertake the difficult, and risky, task of evaluating the sophistication of the 
purchaser."120 
A natural person whose net worth exceeds $1 million qualifies as an accredited 
investor.121 The SEC recently proposed the promulgation of a new standard of rules which would 
increase the net worth standard for accredited investors. The SEC proposed these modifications 
in order to comply with the provisions under §413 of the Dodd-Frank Act.122 Tne goal behind 
na.l"Towing the scope of accreditation was to ensure that investors participating in higher risk 
investments understood - and could afford -to lose the income invested. The SEC's new 
117 The federal securities laws define the term accredited investor in Rule 501 of Regulation D as: 
1. A bank, insurance company, registered investment company business development company, or small business 
investment company; 
2. an employee benefit plan, within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, if a bank, 
insurance company, or registered investment adviser makes the investment decisions, or if the plan has total assets 
m excess of:!>) miiiion; 
3. a charitable organization, corporation, or partnership with assets exceeding $5 million; 
4. a director, executive officer, or general partner of the company selling the securities; 
5. a business in which all the equity ovvners are accredited investors; 
6. a natural person who has individual net worth, or joint net worth with the person's spouse, that exceeds $1 million 
at the time ofthe purchase, excluding the value ofthe primary residence of such person; 
7. a natural person with income exceeding $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with a 
spouse exceeding $300,000 for those years and a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current 
year, 
8. or a trust with assets in excess of $5 million, not formed to acquire the securities offered, whose purchases a 
sophisticated person makes. 
For more information, visit htto://www.sec.gov/answers/accred.htm. 
118 JAMES COX, ROBERT W. HTI..LMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & 
MATERIALS 2009) at 283. 
119 !d. at 283. 
120 !d. at 283. 
121 !d. at 284. 
122 Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed Rule No. 33-9177, ''Net Worth Standards for Accredited Investors." Jan. 25, 
2011 
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proposed rule seeks to adjust the accredited investor qualification to a person with a net worth in 
excess of $1 million, excluding the primary residence of such person (previously the value of the 
primary residence was included in the net worth calculation).123 The Dodd-Frank Act required 
the removal of this inclusion of the primary residence in order to ensure a higher threshold of 
wealth under the term accredited investor.124 
The reason for this change is to advance the regulatory purposes promulgated under the 
Dodd-Frank Act. The changes are appropriate and consistent with the purposes outlined under 
§413(a)125 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which aim to remove the "value of the primary residence" 
from the calculation of net worth for the purposes of identifying if an investor is accredited or 
not.126 This aims to protect investors from betting their homes and assuming greater risk than is 
suitable for their resources and investment goals. 1bis modification would undoubtedly reduce 
the number of accredited investors.127 The SEC's proposed rule identified that a 2007 Federal 
Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances estimated 10,496,312 of the 116,122,128 U.S. 
123 The rule proposes defining an accredit investor as 
Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time of purchase, exceeds 
$1,000,000, excluding the value of the primary residence of such natural person, calculated by subtracting from the estimated fair 
market value of the property the amount of debt secured by the property, up to the estimated fair market value of the property. 
For more information, see: Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed Rule No. 33-9177, .. Net Worth Standards for 
Accredited Investors." Jan. 25, 2011 
124 Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed Rule No. 33-9177, "Net Worth Standards for Accredited Investors." Jan. 25, 
2011 
125 The text of Section 413( a) reads as follows: 
The Commission shall adjust any net worth standard for an accredited investor, as set forth in the rules of the Commission under 
the Securities Act of 1933, so that the individual net worth of any natural person, or joint net worth with the spouse of that 
person, at the time of purchase, is more than $1,000,000 (as such amount is adjusted periodically by rule of the Commission), 
excluding the value of the primary residence of such natural person, except that during the 4-year period that begins on the date 
of enactment of this Act, any net worth standard shall be $1,000,000, excluding the value ofthe primary residence of such natural 
person. 
126 Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed Rule No. 33-9177, ~'Net Worth Standards for Accredited Investors." Jan. 25, 
2011 
127 ld at 9. 
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households (9.04%) qualified as accredited investors.128 The proposal under §413(a) would 
reduce this number to 6,858,335 households, or 5.91 o/o as the total estimated number of 
accredited investors. In other words, the Dodd-Frank Act and the proposed SEC rule will reduce 
the number of individuals that can invest in certain securities as accredited investors. 
This proposal is logical in light of the federal concerns that prompted the enactment of 
the Dodd-Frank Act. The U.S. fmancial crisis fueled concerns regarding investor unsuitability, 
lack of investor understanding of complex fmancial concepts, and a regulatory response to 
protect investors. In litigation concerning sophistication, the court determined in Mark v. FSC 
Securities Corp. 870 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1989) that 'The best tactic for an issuer seeking to 
eliminate any question about the exemption's availability is to limit an issuance to accredited 
investors.~~129 In other words, limiting the purchase requirements to only certain investors assures 
suitability and reduces litigation. 
Consequently, the adoption of a rebuttable presumption that the law view retail investors 
below a certain threshold as unsophisticated investors is similar to the relevance of limiting 
participation in certain securities investments to only accredited investors. First, it would deter, 
under penalty of civil sanctions, the practices of unscrupulous broker-dealers and investment 
advisers from preying on retail investors that simply cannot afford to take great risks in the 
securities markets. This is because the very presence of a rebuttable presumption would shift the 
burden of proof during litigation to the securities professional that recommended the security. If 
the investor did not meet the income requirements to participate, the law would tum to the 
128 Jd. at .9. For more information, visit http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/scfmdex.html. 
129 Mark v. FSC Securities Corp, F. 2d 331 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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securities professional to prove that the recommendation remained valid and appropriate for the 
investor. 
Second, the adoption of such a standard would avoid frivolous lawsuits and arbitration 
hearings against securities professionals. This is because of the shifted burden of proof. A 
securities professional would not be permitted to sell a security to an unsuitable candidate, or one 
that did not meet the investment threshold. Adopting a presumption would likely find its way as 
a rule of conduct incorporated into the oversight responsibilities of the SROs that monitor and 
oversee broker-dealers and investment professionals. While regulating the conduct of the 
securities professional would remain in the hands of the SRO, the presence of such a standard 
would create bright-line rules and tests for enforcement. Third, adoption of a rebuttable 
presumption would restore and stabilize retail investor confidence and participation in the 
securities markets by creating clear guidelines of conduct and restricting access to individuals 
who simply cannot afford the risks of participating in securities markets. 
Why Government Involvement Remains Necessary 
Critics of this concept might view the presumption as overly paternalistic. Opponents 
would also point to the federal government interfering in matters that are outside of its concern. 
This is likely the same argument advanced by opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act and its 
predecessor, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. Notable critics of Sarbanes-Oxley included 
well-respected scholar Roberta Romano, who dubbed the SOX legislation as an example of 
"quack corporate governance" and "an enormous policy blunder" legislated under emergency 
circumstances.130 Professor Romano argued that Congress created SOX in reaction to several 
130 
Roberta Romano, The Sarhanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521 (2005). 
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high profile corporate fraud and insolvency cases.131 This dramatic change, Professor Romano 
argued, overstepped the delicate balance between the federal and state relationship on corporate 
governance. Prof. Romano called SOX a policy blunder that created costly regulatory 
approaches for corporations. These costs would limit and restrict innovation and the free market 
economy, accordi11g to Professor Roma..11o. 132 
Scholars who agree with Professor Romano, such as Pro£ Stephen Bainbridge, call the 
Dodd-Frank Act onerous legislation that over-steps the boundaries of regulation and free 
market. 133 Such experts would likely shudder at the notion of a rebuttable presumption that 
investors below certain thresholds of wealth should not participate in the securities markets 
because it imputes government intervention in the decisions of private individuals. 
This paper argues that bigger government remains necessary to protect investors as the 
U.S. struggles to regain its fmner economic ground in light of the nation's recent economic 
woes. The crisis of investor confidence led to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, and its 
predecessor, SOX. Despite passionate pleas from business and lobbying groups, the federal 
government deemed SOX regulations so essential that they remain in existence today. 
Opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act, or advocates of smaller government, contend that drastic 
measures associated with financial distress and reform should not justify excessive government 
intervention. 134 
131 ld 
132 ld 
133 Stephen Bainbridge, "Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance, Round II." 2010, p.5 
134 Jim Hawkins. "Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress. Indiana Law 
Journal, Vol. 86:1361. 
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These same scholars contend that in order for government standards to be effective, they 
must be narrowly tailored to avoid misguided and overly broad policy implications.135 If 
regulations become too onerous, critics contend, the regulations risk eliminating the presence of 
smaller fmancial services institutions and providers that tailor to a narrow niche of individuals. 
For example, those service providers that tailor to the less wealthy segment of the U.S. 
population may no longer be able to provide services, if the extent of regulation becomes too 
onerous. However these concerns remain unwarranted. Government regulation protects 
consumers, just as it did in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Excessive investor risk led to 
the current economic woes, an aggressive legislation remains crucial to remedying the nation's 
financial missteps. 
While critics of the Dodd-Frank Act will likely continue to rruse concerns about 
excessive government entanglement in the securities markets, a repeal of the Dodd-Frank Act 
remains unlikely, particularly given the historical precedence of SOX remaining in effect. This 
paper does not intend to offer opinions on the merits of the Dodd-Frank Act, but merely contend 
that its complex rules and requirements pose an opportunity to craft a framework to implement a 
uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment advisers through the adoption of 
viable groundwork. In other words, if the measures of the Dodd-Frank Act truly do remain here 
to stay, it is up to regulators to shape the legislation to further the goal of consumer protection. 
CONCLUSION 
As the U.S. economy struggles to repair itself, the government, business and the 
American people will play a vital role. The Dodd-Frank Act represents not only an ambitious 
overhaul of the U.S. regulatory regime, but also a concerted effort on the part of legislators to 
135 HAWKINS, Supra at 1361. 
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study, evaluate, and prevent catastrophic fmancial events that impacted the U.S. economy 
between 2007-2009. In addition to identifying and mitigating systemic risks in the system,136 
equally important is protecting consumers from exploitation and abuse. Consumers will form the 
lifeblood of rebuilding the U.S. economy. The consumer fmance sector impacts the main players 
i..11 the flnancial services sector, includi..lJ.g ba..lJ.ks, mutual funds, i..lJ.sura..lJ.ce compa..rries, brokerage 
firms, government bodies, and more. 137 The U.S. economy needs consumers to make payments, 
save and invest, borrow money, and manage risk.138 
In order to repair investor confidence, it remains critical that the regulations and fiduciary 
duties of broker-dealers harmonize with those requirements of investment advisers. As we 
recognize the important role consumers play in rebuilding the economy, equally important is to 
repair their confidence in regulatory oversight to prevent the repetition of previous events. The 
Dodd-Frank legislation goes a long way in setting a stronger framev.fork for better oversight. 
However, the legislation overlooked (perhaps by design) the critical area of harmonizing 
fiduciary standards between broker-dealers and investment advisers. Individuals in these 
professions play a key role in actively recruiting new individuals to securities markets and in 
managing the money of investors. Currently both professions are held to different standards, 
whereby investment advisers are obligated under duties of fiduciary obligation, while broker-
dealers may act as free-wheeling sales agents. 
The Dodd-Frank Act mandated the study of the impact of this distinction and came to the 
conclusion, like many scholars, that harmonizing the regulations would increase accountability 
136 Viral Archarya, Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew Richardson and Ingo Walter, Regulating Wall Street: the Dodd-Frank Act and 
the New Architecture of Global Finance. (20 11 ), p. 11 
137 Andrea Ryan, Gunnar Trumbull and Peter Tufano. "A Brief Postwar History of Consumer Finance." Harvard Business School 
(201 0), p. 4. 
138 Jd. at 5. 
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among fmancial services flrms and enhance consumer protection and confidence in the longer 
term. Key to minimizing investor fraud and abuse by securities professionals is the concept of 
suitability of investments based on a retail investor's objectives and goals, and the notion of 
sophistication. 
This paper strongly advocates the adoption of a rebuttable presumption that the law view 
retail investors below a certain threshold as unsophisticated. The SEC has begun to re-examine 
the net worth of accredited investors, and this paper contends that a similar standard should apply 
to retail investors that participate in the securities markets. This will minimize predatory 
practices and deter unscrupulous broker-dealers and investment advisers from preying on 
unsuitable investors. It will also facilitate arbitration and securities litigation, by creating a clear 
framework that will allow parties to assess the merits of their claims before litigation. Adding 
this vital component will strengthen the U.S. economy and restore confidence in U.S. securities 
markets. 
The regulatory reforms enacted are undoubtedly onerous. However the financial 
condition that befell the United States in the past decade is frequently compared and contrasted 
against the lessons learned from the 193 Os, when America was struggling to emerge from the 
Great Depression. Historians consider finatJ.cial crises as recurring phenomena that can bring the 
fmancial system to a halt, and often lead "to sharp economic contractions."139 The contractions 
that occurred in the pre-1934 era eventually inspired "1he great expansion of financial regulation 
and the creation of many of the central regulatory institutions - the FDIC and the SEC - that we 
rely on to this day."140 
139 Id at 13. 
140-d L at 11. 
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Only time will provide an opportunity to judge the efficacy and impact of the Dodd-
Frank legislation, and the other suggested reforms. Despite the concerns of smaller government 
advocates that such regulatory oversight will stifle innovation, it is important to remember that 
reforms that protect consumers from unethical marketing practices and predatory behavior will 
ultir.aately help expa.t1d the U.S. economy. Conswuers are a vital pru.-t of fr.J.s equation atJ.d -vvith 
the help of consistent, fair, and effective oversight, both big business and consumers may 
flourish. 
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